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Abstract 
The recent wave of globalization has made the global corporations to take advantage of the international tax 
differences and suitably shift their profits from low tax to high tax jurisdictions. In this paper, we consider a 
simple world with two countries with different market sizes and n multinationals having a branch in each 
country. For simplicity, we have considered that both the countries impose a source-based tax on profit of the 
multinational firms. Moreover, these firms function in a Cournot framework with tax competition between the 
countries and shift their profit depending on the extent of tax differential. But profit shifting is costly as there 
is a chance of getting caught. In this backdrop, we propose a simple theoretical model which puts emphasis on 
the role of concealment of true profits in a framework of tax competition. It is shown that given the similar 
administrative efficiency across the countries, a higher probability of non-detection indicates that more profits 
will be declared in the lower tax country. Also, a fall in non-detection probability will reduce the tax revenue 
but there is a possibility that it might raise the overall revenue collections of the government. So, the focus 
should not only be on tax revenue per se but on other forms of revenue collections also.  
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Introduction 
The recent wave of globalization has made the global corporations to exploit the international tax differences 
and accordingly shift their profits from low tax to high tax jurisdictions. We propose some solutions that are 
applicable to all jurisdictions with different tax rates and market sizes. To start with, it is common knowledge 
that there exists a fiscal externality when several countries share a movable tax base, i.e. the tax rate set by one 
country has an impact on the tax base of the other country and may lead to inefficient outcomes deviating from 
the optimum. The literature has identified this fiscal externality and policy prescriptions to control its negative 
effects have become a major concern (Hindriks et al., 2014). The fact that multinationals use their various 
affiliates as an instrument to shift profits across countries is well recognized. Countries compete in source 
based taxes and multinational firms shift profits from the high to the low tax country at some cost. The concept 
of cost that is being talked about is defined as concealment cost and there exists a rich literature in this regard 
(Haufler & Schjelderup, 2000; Kind et al., 2003, Riedel & Runkel, 2006; Schindler & Schjelderup, 2013). The 
global corporations use the tax differentials to trim down their tax liability coupled with the problem that these 
tax rates are chosen in a non-cooperative manner by different governments simultaneously. In this respect, 
Raimondos-Møller and Scharf (2002), Mansori and Weichenrieder (2001) try to give shape to transfer pricing 
rules put in place by two competing governments and investigate how such tax competition affects the 
equilibrium tax rates. In spite of the increasing importance of multinational firms streamlining their financial 
flows across provinces (Refer to OECD’s website for details on BEPS1), the study of corrective measures in a 
framework where countries compete for profits of multinationals has not been analyzed thus far. In this context, 
will imposing strict rules with regard to profit shifting be beneficial for countries with heterogeneous features. 
Does the presence of stringent rules affect the revenue collections of the governments adversely? Also, how 
will a change in the rules relating to profit shifting influence the magnitude of profit a multinational firm 
declares. This paper has taken a modest attempt in resolving these fusillade of questions that have motivated 
this topic.  
                                                     
1Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax avoidance tactics that exploit gaps and loopholes in tax rules. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A select literature on issues relating to the taxation of MNCs has 
been reviewed in Section b. In Section c, we characterize the model, followed by discussing the results of the 
model in Section d. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion. 
Review of Select Literature 
The literature on tax competition literature has developed significantly in the recent years with the countries 
competing for the mobile capital base and the inability of the countries to agree on measures of tax 
coordination. The motivation for this topic comes from the scenario where the corporate tax rates across EU 
member countries got affected in an endeavour to do a ‘race to the bottom’ (Haufler and Lülfesmann, 2015). 
The second issue is related to the form of competition of attracting capital and investments in a particular 
jurisdiction. According to Hindriks et al. (2014), “when several national fiscal authorities share a mobile tax 
base, one country’s tax rate changes the tax base of the other, thereby creating a fiscal externality which leads 
to sub-optimal outcomes.” Peralta and van Ypersele (2006) proposed policies like full tax harmonization, tax 
floors and ranges, government’s matching grants to tackle this externality. Their argument was that with such 
policy instruments in place there will be less competitive pressures and to a certain extent one can control this 
“race to the bottom” phenomenon between jurisdictions. In a different setting, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) 
have found that tax revenue as a percent of GDP differs largely between the so-called “core” i.e. developed 
and “periphery” i.e. the developing countries. Their theoretical model justifies that firms in the developed 
(core) countries are more likely to pay higher taxes in return for better infrastructure and proximity to a larger 
market. In a similar setting, Vandenbussche et al. (2005) using firm level effective tax rates for large Belgian 
firms,  find large regional disparities, where the “peripheral” region of Wallonia charges a much lower effective 
tax rate than the “core” region of Flanders.  
Moving away from the impact on the profit levels of MNCs, there is a growing body of literature which talks 
about cross country tax competition and other related issues in this context. A brief discussion on other issues 
related to cross country tax competition follows. Fumagalli’s (2003) work looks into tax competition between 
two countries that host one local firm but differ in terms of technology levels and compete to attract the 
manufacturing plant of a producer from a third country. Haufler and Wooton (1999) bring in the population 
dimension to discuss the case of tax competition between two countries having different sizes (in terms of 
population). They show that the MNCs will have an incentive to locate in the larger country given a very small 
amount of subsidy provision. Besley and Seabright (1999) introduced competition for foreign direct investment 
between asymmetric countries in a two stage dynamic game. It is not only that countries compete in taxes but 
also competition in terms of providing infrastructure which adds another dimension to this issue. Combes and 
Lafourcade (2001), in the context of France, show that more firms have come in due to a decrease in the 
transport costs on account of better infrastructural facilities when analyzed over a period of 20 years. Similar 
observations were made by Duranton and Puga (2001). Lastly, in a completely different set-up, Karlsson and 
Zhang (2001) incorporate how changes in education policy and human capital formation can affect the location 
of a multinational corporation.  
Coming back to the focus area, the concept of tax competition creating an intense pressure on the governments 
to reduce their corporate tax rates is a part of a growing body of literature which has kind of taken off since 
the work by Wilson (1999). Detailed attempts based on empirical evidences are really hard to come by may 
be due to the difficulty faced in deciding on an appropriate measure of taxation and hence fixing up the rate. 
Apart from these, changes in definitions of tax base and the net impact on the incentives of MNCs to invest 
have also hindered the carrying out of such empirical exercises. However, in spite of the pervasive evidence 
about the increasing importance of multinational firms in the globalized economy and on their capacity to 
restructure the financial flows across divisions to reduce tax liability, the study of how to make use of corrective 
devices (especially, with a focus on non-tax revenue) in such a system in which countries compete for the 
profits of multinationals has not been studied so far. The major gap lies here as theoretical models elaborate 
the tax revenue part but, in general, tend to overlook the non-tax revenue portion in the Government’s 
optimization problem.  
In this background, this paper makes a preliminary attempt to re-interpret the results under a situation of tax 
competition for the profit of multinationals but the twist is that profit shifting is now costly and there is a 
chance of getting caught. Moreover, the government can extract a part of the MNCs profit through fines, which 
is a part of non-tax revenue, thereby showing that there can be a trade off between such tax and non-tax 
revenue. So to address this issue the author proposes a simple theoretical model which shows that given the 
similar administrative efficiency across countries, a higher probability of non-detection indicates that more 
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profits will be declared in the lower tax country. It shows that even though a fall in the non-detection probability 
reduces tax revenue but it might raise the overall revenue collections of the government. So, the focus should 
not only be on tax revenue per se but on other forms of revenue collections also. 
Theoretical Framework – The Model 
There are two countries, a and b, where the authors have considered inverse market demand curves given by,  
݌௔ ൌ  ߛ௔ െ  ߚݍ௔ … … … ሺ1ሻ             
݌௕ ൌ  ߛ௕ െ  ߚݍ௕ … … … ሺ2ሻ 
Given, ߛଵ  ൒  ߛଶ  
There are n multinational firms and each of these n homogeneous firms owns a branch in each country. These 
firms compete in a Cournot framework in each market. The intention of the firms is to move their profits where 
they are subject to lesser tax rates. The unit production costs, the cost to ship goods across countries have been 
normalized to zero. More precisely, letting ߨ௜ ௝  be the profit effectively generated by firm j = 1, 2, 3,……, n in 
country i = a, b. To escape the tax liability, the actual profit generated is not reported. This means that the 
declared profit across the two countries should add up to total profit of the firm in the two countries. Following 
Hindriks et al. (2014), the constraint becomes ߨ௔ ௝ ൅ ߨ௕ ௝ ൌ  ߨ෤௔௝ ൅ ߨ෤௕ ௝  for the jth firm across two countries, 
a and b. ߨ෤௜ ௝ denotes the amount of profit reported by the jth firm in the ith country.  
The firms plan to conceal their true profits based on what taxes the governments in different countries charge. 
Concealing true profits attract a fine and if the firm gets caught the entire profit gets confiscated and the firm 
gets zero. The probability of non-detection is given by d and we have assumed it to remain the same across the 
countries with the objective of simplification. Following Schindler and Schjelderup (2013), we have 
introduced concealment cost in a slightly different manner as : 2ሺߨ௜ ௝ െ ߨ෤௜ ௝ሻଶ for the jth firm in the ith country. 
Doing the concealment of profit counts for both the countries i.e. doing for one country implies that it is done 
for the other country also as the structure is the same. The government in country i sets a source-based tax rate, 
ti, on the profit reported within its tax-jurisdiction by the n multinational firms, and its tax revenue is given by:  
ܴ௜ ൌ  ݐ௜ሺߨ෤ ଵ௜ ൅  ߨ෤ ଶ௜ ൅ ߨ෤ ଷ௜ ൅  … … ߨ෤ ௡௜ሻ, ݅ ൌ ܽ ܽ݊݀ ܾ … … … ሺ3ሻ 
The objective of the jth firm is to maximize its profit across the two countries given the tax rates set by the 
governments of the two countries.  
The Decision of the Firms – A Tax Competition Framework 
The objective of the jth firm,  
max  ݀ሺ1 െ ݐ௔ሻ ߨ෤ ௝௔ ൅ ݀ሺ1 െ ݐ௕ሻߨ෤ ௝௕ െ  2ሺߨ௔௝ െ ߨ෤௔ ௝ሻଶ 
ݓ. ݎ. ݐ ൫ݍ௝௔ ,  ݍ
௝
௕ , ߨ෤௔
௝൯    
ݏ. ݐ   ߨ෤௔ ௝ ൅ ߨ෤௕ ௝ ൌ  ݌௔൫ݍଵ௔ ൅  ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൯ݍ
௝
௔ ൅  ݌௕൫ݍ
ଵ
௕ ൅  ݍ
ଶ
௕ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௕൯ݍ
௝
௕ 
In this case, the number of variables reduces to three as ߨ෤௕௝ can be written in terms of the other three variables.  
Rewriting the maximization problem after combining the constraint,  
݀ሺ1 െ ݐ௔ሻߨ෤ ௝௔ ൅ ݀ሺ1 െ ݐ௕ሻ ቂቀߛ௔ െ  ߚ൫ݍଵ௔ ൅ ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൯ቁ ݍ
௝
௔ ൅ ቀߛ௕ െ  ߚ൫ݍ
ଵ
௕ ൅ ݍ
ଶ
௕ … … ൅
ݍ௡௕൯ቁ ݍ
௝
௕ െ ߨ෤௔
௝ቃ െ 2ሺߨ௔௝ െ ߨ෤௔ ௝ሻଶ  
From the first-order conditions:  
(i) – ݀ݐ௔ ൅ ݀ݐ௕ ൅ 4൫൛ߛ௔ െ  ߚൣݍଵ௔ ൅ ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൧ൟݍ
௝
௔ െ ߨ෤௔
௝൯ ൌ 0 
݋ݎ, െ݀ ൬
ݐ௔ െ ݐ௕
4
൰ ൅ ൛ߛ௔ െ  ߚൣݍଵ௔ ൅  ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൧ൟݍ
௝
௔ ൌ  ߨ෤௔
௝ … … … ሺ4ሻ 
(ii) ݀ሺ1 െ ݐ௕ሻൣߛ௔ െ  ߚ൫ݍଵ௔ ൅  ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൯ െ 2ߚݍ
௝
௔൧ െ 4൫൛ߛ௔ െ ߚൣݍ
ଵ
௔ ൅  ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൧ൟݍ
௝
௔ െ
ߨ෤௔௝൯ൣߛ௔ െ 2ߚݍ௝௔ െ ߚ൫ݍ
ଵ
௔ ൅  ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൯൧ ൌ 0 … … … ሺ5ሻ 
Using (4) and (5) we get, 
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݀ሺ1 െ ݐ௕ሻൣߛ௔ െ  ߚ൫ݍଵ௔ ൅  ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൯ െ 2ߚݍ
௝
௔൧ െ ݀ሺݐ௔ െ  ݐ௕ሻൣߛ௔ െ 2ߚݍ
௝
௔ െ ߚ൫ݍ
ଵ
௔ ൅ ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅
ݍ௡௔൯൧  
݋ݎ, ݀ሺ1 െ ݐ௕ െ  ݐ௔ ൅ ݐ௕ሻൣߛ௔ െ ߚ൫ݍଵ௔ ൅ ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൯ െ 2ߚݍ
௝
௔൧ ൌ  0,  ݐ௔ ് 1, ݀ ് 0 
݋ݎ, ݍ௝௔ ൌ  
ߛ௔ െ ߚ൫ݍଵ௔ ൅  ݍ
ଶ
௔ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௔൯
2ߚ
… … … ሺ6ሻ 
Similarly, carrying out the first order condition in terms of  ݍ௝௕, we have, 
ݍ௝௕ ൌ  
ߛ௕ െ ߚ൫ݍଵ௕ ൅ ݍ
ଶ
௕ … … ൅ ݍ
௡
௕൯
2ߚ
… … … ሺ7ሻ 
Analogously carrying out the maximization exercise for the n firms leads us to n such conditions for the n 
firms, i.e. j = 1,2,3 … n. It should be noted that in equation (6) and (7), the term within brackets include (n1) 
terms actually as jth firm is excluded.  
At the Nash Equilibrium, ݍଵ௔ ൌ  ݍ
ଶ
௔ ൌ ݍ
௝
௔ … … ൌ ݍ
௡
௔ ൌ ݍ
∗
௔  and 
 ݍଵ௕ ൌ  ݍ
ଶ
௕ ൌ ݍ
௝
௕ … … ൌ ݍ
௡
௕ ൌ ݍ
∗
௕.  
So solving the values from equation (6) and equation (7),  
ݍ∗௔ ൌ
ߛ௔
ߚሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ
 , ݍ∗௕ ൌ
ߛ௕
ߚሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ
… … … ሺ8ሻ 
Putting back the values in equation (1) and equation (2), we get,  
݌௔ ൌ
ߛ௔
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ
 , ݌௕ ൌ
ߛ௕
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ
… … … ሺ8ሻ 
By putting back the equilibrium values in equation (4), the profits reported by jth firm in country a and b can 
be derived as follows,  
െ݀ ൬
ݐ௔ െ ݐ௕
4
൰ ൅ ൜ߛ௔ െ  ߚ ൤
݊ߛ௔
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻߚ൨ൠ
ߛ௔
ߚሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ
ൌ  ߨ෤௔௝ … … … ሺ9ሻ 
െ݀ ൬
ݐ௕ െ ݐ௔
4
൰ ൅ ൜ߛ௕ െ  ߚ ൤
݊ߛ௕
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻߚ൨ൠ
ߛ௕
ߚሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ
ൌ  ߨ෤௕ ௝ … … … ሺ10ሻ 
The total profit disclosed in country a is as follows, 
ߨ෤௔ ൌ ݊ߨ෤௔௝, ݆ ൌ 1, 2, 3, … ݊  
⟹  ߨ෤௔  ൌ ݊ ൤െ݀ ൬
ݐ௔ െ ݐ௕
4
൰ ൅ ൜ߛ௔ െ  ߚ ൤
݊ߛ௔
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻߚ൨ൠ
ߛ௔
ߚሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ൨
 
Analogously one can write it for the second country. Firstly, we move on to the first case of tax competition 
among the countries. The objective of the government is to choose the taxes in such a way that global 
corporations get attracted to locate their business in the country having the lower tax rate. The entire thing 
happens in a setting of detection of concealment of true profits. Starting off with tax competition, the 
government in country a collects tax revenue given by,  
ܴ௔ ൌ  ݐ௔ሺߨ෤ ଵ௔ ൅ ߨ෤ ଶ௔ ൅  ߨ෤ ଷ௔ ൅  … … ߨ෤ ௡௔ሻ … … … ሺ11ሻ and similarly, 
 ܴ௕ ൌ  ݐ௕ሺߨ෤ ଵ௕ ൅  ߨ෤ ଶ௕ ൅ ߨ෤ ଷ௕ ൅  … … ߨ෤ ௡௕ሻ … … … ሺ12ሻ 
The first order conditions from the revenue maximization of the government yields,  
߲ܴ௔
߲ݐ௔
ൌ 0 ⟹ ݊ ൤൜ߛ௔ െ  ߚ ൤
݊ߛ௔
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻߚ൨ൠ
ߛ௔
ߚሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ൨
െ ݊݀ ൤
ݐ௔
2
െ
ݐ௕
4 ൨
ൌ 0 … … … ሺ13ሻ 
߲ܴ௕
߲ݐ௕
ൌ 0 ⟹ ݊ ൤൜ߛ௕ െ  ߚ ൤
݊ߛ௕
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻߚ൨ൠ
ߛ௕
ߚሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ൨
െ ݊݀ ൤
ݐ௕
2
െ
ݐ௔
4 ൨
ൌ 0 … … … ሺ14ሻ 
For comparison of the tax rates across countries, following Hindriks et al. (2014) we normalize ߛ௕and ߛ௔ as, 
                                                                                            Financial Markets, Institutions and Risks, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2018 
 101
ߛ௔ ൌ  
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ
݊ ඥ
ߚሺ1 ൅ ߝሻ,  ߛ௕ ൌ
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ
݊ ඥ
ߚሺ1 െ ߝሻ … … … ሺ15ሻ2 
Invoking equation (15) in equation (13) and (14), 
൤
ݐ௔
2
െ
ݐ௕
4 ൨
݊݀ ൌ  
1 ൅ ߝ
݊
… … … ሺ16ሻ 
൤
ݐ௕
2
െ
ݐ௔
4 ൨
݊݀ ൌ  
1 െ ߝ
݊
… … … ሺ17ሻ 
Solving equation (16) and (17) simultaneously,  
ݐ௔ ൌ
4ሺ3 ൅ ߝሻ
3݊ଶ݀
; ݐ௕ ൌ
4ሺ3 െ ߝሻ
3݊ଶ݀
… … … ሺ18ሻ 
Both ta and tb are < 1 as ݊ ൐ 2ට
ଵ
ௗ
ሺ1 ൅ ఌ
ଷ
ሻ 
Results 
Proposition 1: At the Nash equilibrium, there is under-taxation and the joint tax revenue is sub-optimal. If the 
probability of non-detection falls i.e. actually probability of detection rises then profit shifting becomes more 
costly and Nash equilibrium taxes will increase along with joint tax revenue.  
First, under tax cooperation, the objective function is different, 
max ሺݐ௔ , ݐ௕ሻ ݐ௔ሺߨ෤ ଵ௔ ൅ ߨ෤ ଶ௔ ൅ ߨ෤ ଷ௔ ൅  … ߨ෤ ௡௔ሻ ൅ ݐ௕ሺߨ෤ଵ௕ ൅ ߨ෤ ଶ௕ ൅ ߨ෤ ଷ௕ ൅  … ߨ෤ ௡௕ሻ … … … ሺ20ሻ 
Under tax cooperation ݐ௔ ൌ ݐ௕ and since the maximum value that t can take is 1 so the maximum joint revenue 
turns out to be 1. The result is feasible given the condition imposed on  and that tax rates  [0,1]. 
Proposition 2: With the non-detection probability, d, in place, there is a chance that the firm might not get 
caught at all or it might happen that the entire profit gets confiscated. So, a higher value of d means that more 
profits will be declared in the lower tax country. If d  0 (not zero as we have assumed) then more profits will 
be declared in the higher tax country on account of its larger tax base and d  1 means declared profit will 
be more in case of the lower tax country as expected.  
Now, we will check out the impact of probability of non-detection on tax revenue. The value of optimum tax 
revenue in both the countries can be found out by using the optimum values in equation (9), (10) and (18). 
ܴ௔ ൌ  ݐ௔ሺߨ෤ ଵ௔ ൅ ߨ෤ ଶ௔ ൅  ߨ෤ ଷ௔ ൅  … … ߨ෤ ௡௔ሻ 
ܴ௔ ൌ  
4ሺ3 ൅ ߝሻ݊ ൤െ݀ ቀݐ௔ െ ݐ௕4 ቁ ൅ ൜ߛ௔ െ  ߚ ൤
݊ߛ௔
ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻߚ൨ൠ
ߛ௔
ߚሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ൨
3݊ଶ݀
 
Normalizing the values of ߛ௔ܽ݊݀ ߛ௕ using equation (15), 
ܴ௔ ൌ  െ
ሺ3 ൅ ߝሻ
3݊
ሺݐ௔ െ ݐ௕ሻ ൅
4ሺ3 ൅ ߝሻ ቂ݊ ൅ 1݊ଶ ሺ1 ൅ ߝሻ െ
݊ ൅ 1
݊ ߚሺ1 ൅ ߝሻቃ
3݊݀
… … … ሺ21ሻ 
߲ܴ௔
߲݀
ൌ  െ
4ሺ3 ൅ ߝሻ ቂ݊ ൅ 1݊ଶ ሺ1 ൅ ߝሻ െ
݊ ൅ 1
݊ ߚሺ1 ൅ ߝሻቃ
3݊݀ଶ
൐ 0 ݃݅ݒ݁݊ ߚ ൐  
1
݊
; 
As d rises ܴ௔ rises. Similarly, doing for country b, we have  
ܴ௕ ൌ  െ
ሺ3 െ ߝሻ
3݊
ሺݐ௕ െ  ݐ௔ሻ ൅
4ሺ3 െ ߝሻ ቂ݊ ൅ 1݊ଶ ሺ1 െ ߝሻ െ
݊ ൅ 1
݊ ߚሺ1 െ ߝሻቃ
3݊݀
… … … ሺ22ሻ 
߲ܴ௕
߲݀
ൌ െ 
4ሺ3 െ ߝሻ ቂ݊ ൅ 1݊ଶ ሺ1 െ ߝሻ െ
݊ ൅ 1
݊ ߚሺ1 െ ߝሻቃ
3݊݀ଶ
൐ 0; 
                                                     
2ࢿ denotes the heterogeneity between the two countries in terms of fiscal revenue, market size, etc, i.e. ૙ ൑ ࢿ ൑ ૚ 
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Proposition 3: A rise in the probability of non-detection implies that there is a lesser chance of getting caught 
which in turn means that given the normal tax rates, tax revenue rises irrespective of which country we are 
talking about. Alternatively, this can be intuitively explained through the fact that the moment d falls, the profit 
of more firms will be confiscated i.e. those firms will be left with zero profit, so on zero profit tax cannot be 
imposed. As a result tax revenue falls.  
Here, we are actually talking about tax revenue per se but the confiscated income of those firms who gets 
caught also come to the government treasury. The moment that income comes into the picture and explicitly 
gets modeled then looking into the outcome will become more interesting.  
We remodel the total revenue collected as tax revenue plus the confiscated income of those firms who have 
been detected of concealing true profits. 
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So, carrying out the same exercise of looking into what happens to the revenue collections of the government 
under a situation of a rise in probability of non-detection. 
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Analogously, for country b, 
߲ܴ௕
߲݀
ൌ  2݀݊
ݐ௕ െ ݐ௔
4
൰ െ ݊ ൬
ݐ௕ െ ݐ௔
4
൰ ቈ1 ൅
4ሺ3 െ ߝሻ
3݊ଶ
቉ െ ൜
݊ ൅ 1
݊ଶ
ሺ1 െ ߝሻ െ
݊ ൅ 1
݊
ߚሺ1 െ ߝሻൠ 
Given, the condition, ߚ ൐  ଵ
௡
 , The signs of  డோೌ
డௗ
  and  డோ್
డௗ
  will depend on the strength of the negative and the 
positive effects. The first term is positive, the last term is negative but with a negative sign before, it becomes 
positive and the middle term is positive but with a negative sign before, it becomes negative. 
Proposition 4: The overall change in revenue collections will get determined not only through tax revenue 
collection but also through confiscated profits. So, a falling d means, a fall in the tax revenue but more of 
confiscated profits. At this point, the strength of these two effects will determine whether a fall in d can actually 
raise the revenue collections of the government. Also, the government should focus not only on taxes but also 
on other forms of revenue collection i.e. fines, confiscation of profit, etc.  
Concluding Remarks 
For many years tax policy in countries like USA, UK, Germany and France exempted foreign source-income 
fully or almost fully from domestic taxation. In the context of corporate taxation, it is indeed striking to know 
that there is a significant rise in the number of countries exempting foreign-source income. According to 
Devereux et al. (2008), out of 37 high-income countries, 19 had an exemption system in 1998, rising to 27 in 
2008. A number beyond one’s imagination. Realistically, one can relate this situation to the case of South 
Korea in the recent years. South Korea’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (given the level of GDP remaining 
roughly the same during the period 2011-16 at constant PPP$) shows a declining trend whereas fines or 
penalties as percentage of GDP during the same period at constant PPP$ shows a rising trend of a much higher 
magnitude (Refer to Figure 1). This model can provide an argument, as already explained in Proposition 4 on 
the existence of such a trade off between fines or penalties and corporate tax revenue collections. The primary 
objective of this paper is to throw light on the fact that even when tax rates are lowered to attract MNC’s, 
government’s tax revenue collection falls but through other forms of non-tax revenue like fines or penalties, 
the government can make up for it and maintain the overall revenue collections. 
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Figure 1. Corporate Tax Revenue vs. Fines or Penalties as a percentage of GDP 
Source: Data as retrieved from OECD database. 
In this context, the paper has highlighted that how in a n firm and two country framework there is under-
taxation in equilibrium and combined tax revenue is sub-optimal in the presence of penalty imposition for 
concealment of profits when two countries are competing for the profits of MNCs. A higher chance of non-
detection implies that higher will be the profits declared in the low tax jurisdiction, vice versa. The attention-
grabbing observation has been the movement of tax revenue in line with the probability of non-detection. The 
more the chance of not getting caught higher will be the tax revenue collected, vice versa. Does it mean that a 
higher chance of detection brings less revenue to the government treasury? As we have shown, a higher chance 
of detection means lower tax revenue collection but other forms of collections i.e. fines, penalty, etc. needs to 
be incorporated to get a holistic view of the revenue collections of the government. Thus, depending on the 
size of the market and the number of firms a higher chance of detection can bring in increased revenue (overall). 
Furthermore, the chance of non-detection becomes crucial in determining the extent of tax competition. The 
soundness of this model in a setting of diverse administrative capabilities i.e. presence of different detection 
probabilities is an exercise worth exploring and has been left for further research.  
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